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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
RICHARD R 
PATRICIA ] 
VS. 
DR. JAMES 
. BLACK, D. 
BLACK, 
Plaintiffs 
S. BOYCE, 
Defendant 
D.S. 
> and 
and 
and ) 
Appellants, ) 
Respondent. ) 
Case No. 14358 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action for damages brought by the buyers 
of corporate stock against the seller for an illegal sale of 
the stock which was the subject matter of the buyers1 condition-
al sales agreement contrary to the provisions in the Uniform 
Commercial Code. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to the Court. From a verdict for 
the defendant of no cause of action the plaintiffs appeal. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellants seek to have the judgment of the 
Trial Court reversed and a new trial granted to determine 
plaintiffs1 damages from the wrongful sale of the purchased 
stock. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In August, 1961, the plaintiffs and the defend-
ant, together with one, Doctor E. Wayne Allred, purchased 
a property fronting on State Street in Orem, Utah. The 
property had formerly been a motel and had an approximate 
size of three and one-half acres. (Tr. 4) After acquisi-
tion the owners of the property incorporated under the 
name of Orem Professional Plaza, Inc. and issued 90 
sharps £ stock, 30 shares to each of them. (Tr. 6 
jLMiies 7-11) They then transferred all of the property to 
the corporation. (Tr. 14 lines 2-9) Each of the three 
owners established their professional offices in separate 
suites in the former motel property. In 1963 the defend-
ant moved his dental practice to the State of California 
(Tr. 6 lines 25-27) and in 1964 negotiated to sell plain-
tiffs his 30 shares of stock in Orem Professional Plaza, 
Inc. (Tr. 6 lines 28-30) On June 4, 1964, the defendant 
forwarded a letter consummating the transaction (ex. 4) 
and a letter of resignation (Ex. 5) as officer and direct-
or of the corporation. (Tr. 7 lines 20-25) No formal 
agreement was prepared for the stock purchase, but the 
plaintiffs executed a promissory note for $3,343.20 (Ex. 
2) (Tr. 8 lines 4-9 and Tr. 8 lines 25-30) The defendant, 
seller of the stock, retained possession of the stock 
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certificates, the parties agreeing by their testimony that the 
stock was to be transferred upon completion of payment. (Tr. 
64 lines 3-7 and 23-30) The plaintiffs made irregular payments 
to the defendant on the promissory note through May 13, 1967. 
(Ex. 7) (Tr. 9 lines 3-7) In 1964 four payments were made, in 
1965 two payments, two in 1966, and in 1967 three, all of 
different and varying amounts. (Ex. 7) By February 28, 1967 
plaintiffs had made advance payments of $102.02, more than 
required by the terms of the promissory note. By May 13, 
1967, they were $45.46 paid in advance. By July 7, 1967, 
according to the terms of the promissory note they were $65.98 
in arrears. On July 7, 1967, the defendant claimed to have 
sent a letter to the Plaintiff, Richard R. Black, but not 
addressed to the Plaintiff, Patricia Black, the other purchaser 
(Ex. 8) (Tr. 17 lines 2630, Tr. 18 lines 19-29) The letter was 
never received by the plaintiffs. (Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There-
after, on December 6, 1967, the defendant received a letter 
from the plaintiffs (Ex. 6) together with a check for two 
installments in the sum of $111.76. (Tr. 9 lines 24-30, Tr. 
10 lines 2-7) The letter informed the defendant that the 
plaintiffs would pay two payments monthly and had sold other 
property by which they would soon be able to pay the balance 
owing upon the note. The defendant did not respond to the 
letter but banked the payments received with the letter. On 
August 7, 1967, prior to the receipt of the two installments 
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and the letter of December 6, 1967, the defendant sold 
the 30 shares of stock to the other stockholders of Orem 
Professional Plaza for the then remaining unpaid balance 
upon the promissory note. (Tr. 13 lines 17-21) No 
further notice of any kind was given to the plaintiffs. 
No notification was given to the plaintiffs after the 
receipt of the two installments and the letter of 
December 6, 1967 which informed the plaintiffs of the 
prior sale of the stock to the other owners of the 
Orem Professional Plaza, Inc. (Tr. 67 lines 1-10) 
After the letter of December 6, 196 7 from the plaintiffs 
to the defendant no further communication transferred 
between them. Thereafter, the other owners of Orem 
Professional Plaza made a demand for rentals and 
eventually evicted the plaintiffs from the Professional 
Offices. (Ex. 9) 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE 
ADMISSION OF EXHIBIT 8 NOTICE LETTER ALLEGEDLY 
SENT BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF RICHARD 
BLACK 
In keeping with Campbell v. Gowans & Milner, 
(1909), 35 Utah 268, 100 Pac. 397, the trial court should 
have ruled that the presumption of delivery of Exhibit 8 
was overcome by the testimony of Plaintiff Richard 
-4-
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Black. (Tr. 29 lines 16-21) There is no evidence or 
testimony that the Plaintiff Patricia Black was ever 
sent any notice of intention to sell the stock. The 
Exhibit 8 was allegedly sent to the Plaintiff Richard 
Black at his place of business not at the residence. 
(Tr. 18 Lines 19-27) Defendant's brief states as proof 
that Plaintiff Richard Black received the letter (Ex. 8) 
notifying the plaintiffs that the stock would be 
sold, the fact that if the plaintiffs did not receive the 
letter, why would plaintiffs call the defendant to ask if 
defendant still had the stock. That question is answered 
by the Plaintiff Richard Black's testimony (Tr. 25 lines 
9-21; Tr. 29 lines 22-28) wherein he stated that he had 
received an eviction notice from the premises on 
November 30 and called the defendant to find out why 
he was being evicted from property he was ostensibly 
purchasing. In that conversation, the defendant indicated 
to the plaintiff that he still had the stock. Thereupon 
the plaintiff wrote the letter (Ex. 6) acknowledged by the 
defendant as having been received on December 6 with 
two payments upon the promissory note. It is inconceiv-
able to believe that the plaintiff would have sent payments 
to the defendant with the letter (Ex. 6) if, as claimed 
by the defendant, in the month previous to such payments 
Molly Allred had informed the plaintiff that she had the 
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stock and that plaintiff could redeem it from her, 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE 
REMEDIES OF THE UNPAID SELLER BOTH UNDER 
THE PRESENT LAW AND THE FORMER LAW RELATIVE 
TO NOTICE OF DEFAULT AND RESCISSION 
Defendant's brief suggests that because Title 
70A was not effective until December 31, 1965, and that 
therefore the question raised by plaintiffs in their 
brief as to their rights to return of funds upon rescission 
is not well taken. Prior to the enactment of the Uniform 
Commercial Code in Utah, the applicable law in Utah was 
the Uniform Sales Act, Title 60, Utah Code Annotated. 
Because this was an oral agreement for the sale of stock 
and because other than the promissory note there was 
no written agreement setting out the terms of the sale, 
it is difficult to determine whether this transaction 
was a sale or a contract. This Court had ruled on the 
matter of the passage of title under Section 60-1-1 in 
Middletown v. Evans, (1953), 86 Utah 396, 45 P.2d 570, 
where the court said at page 572: 
. . .In a contract to sell, the parties 
agreed to transfer the property in the 
goods at some future time, whereas in 
the sale the parties agreed to transfer 
the property presently. 
Whether the sale of stock by defendant to plaintiffs 
would appear from the Middletown case to constitute 
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(2) Where the property in goods has not passed 
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case the buyer should default, then it must be shown 
that the buyer has been in default on the payment of 
the price an unreasonable time before the seller may 
resell the goods. In the case before the Court, certainly 
the goods are not perishable in nature and the seller 
had not expressly reserved the right of resale in case 
the buyer should default, but only that the buyer was 
not to receive the possession of the stock until it was 
paid. Therefore, the responsibility of seller is to 
establish that the buyer had been in default an unreason-
able time or provide adequate notice. Subparagraph (3) 
of Section 60-4-9, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, 
bears further in this matter, pointing out that although 
the validity of resale is not determined by notice given 
to the original buyer, it does provide that where the 
resale is not based on perishable nature of the goods 
or an express provision giving right of resale of the 
goods: 
. . . The giving or failure to give such 
notice shall be relevant in any issue 
involving the question whether the 
buyer had been in default an unreasonable 
time before the resale was made. 
Section 60-4-9(3), Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended. 
Thus by code section the right of resale without notice 
would have to be predicated upon the buyer having been 
-8-
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reasonable diligence and effort to make a 
resale of the repossessed property within 
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possible price thereforef and credit the 
defendant with" the proceeds as specified 
in the contract. [emphasis supplied] 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
which would have been required on a rescission of the 
contract. Section 6-4-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended, further spells out that the seller may have a 
right to rescind "where the buyer has been in default in 
payment of the price." But under that section in order 
to rescind the section provides: 
The transfer of title shall not be held 
to have been rescinded by an unpaid seller 
until he has manifested by notice to the 
buyer, or by some other overt act, an 
intention to rescind . . . [emphasis 
supplied] Section 60-4-10(2), Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
Although the section provides that it is not necessary 
that the overt act be communicated to the buyer: 
• • • The giving or failure to give notice 
to the buyer of the intention to rescind 
shall be relevant in any issue involving 
the question whether the buyer had been 
in default an unreasonable time before the 
right of rescission was asserted.""Section 
60-4-10(2), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as 
amended. 
Thus the statutes and the case law make it 
apparent that the rules pertaining to rescission or of 
selling the goods after default and the rights of the 
buyer in the property were not substantially different 
under the former Uniform Sales Act than under the Uniform 
Commercial Code now in force. 
If the seller elects to rescind, notice, which 
is not only sent to but received by the buyer, would be 
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a forfeiture of the plaintiffs' rights in the matter. 
As cited in Fullmer v. Blood, 546 P.2d 606, decided 
by this Court February 18, 1976, as the correct statement 
of the law for the Sta te of Utah: 
. . . When a seller accepts late payments 
which allow a buyer to believe the forfeiture 
provision will not be strictly enforced, 
the court will not enforce it unless notice 
is given and a reasonable time allowed to 
make the delinquencies; and that where the 
forfeiture of the amount that has been paid 
in would be so inequitable as to be unconscion-
able the court of equity will refuse to 
enforce it. Malmberg v. Baugh, (1923), 
62 Utah 331, 508 P. 975; Lamont v. Evjen, 
(1973), 29 Utah 2d 266, 508 P.2d 532; 
Paul v. Kitt, 544 P.2d 886 (Utah December 
1975) Id. at 609 
Yet the failure to acknowledge the plaintiffs' right to 
damages for the forfeiture imposed upon them is the 
enforcement of an unconscionable forfeiture where there 
has been no compliance with the rules of law regarding 
rescission of sale. 
POINT III 
Plaintiffs' claim for recovery of damages 
predicated upon the fact that defendant attempted to 
rescind without complying with the requirements of 
rescission (not having made a valid rescission either 
as to notice or as to return of consideration) should 
have been granted. Had the stock been sold for market 
value, defendant could have returned plaintiffs' payments 
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and completed a rescission, but in this case the defendant 
did not sell for market value or the best price obtainable, 
did not rescind, did not return the consideration and 
restore the former status of the buyer and seller. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS RULING ON THE 
ALLEGED DEFAULT OF THE DEFENDANTS 
Defendant contends that in November of 1967 
Molly Allred, one of the subsequent buyers of the stock 
which was to be purchased by the plaintiffs from the 
defendant, spoke with Plaintiff Richard Balck and informed 
him that she held his stock and he could redeem it. 
Defendant further admits that on December 6, 1967 he 
received the plaintiffs1 letter and two (2) installments 
upon the note, some four (4) months after he had ostensibly 
sold his stock to Molly Allred and the other purchasers. 
(Tr. 9 lines 24-30; Tr. 10 lines 1-7; Tr. 29 lines 6-21) 
It is inconceivable that the plaintiffs would have been 
told by Molly Allred that she held their stock and they 
could redeem it in adjoining offices to theirs in the 
month of November, 1967, and then in December of 1967 
that Plaintiff Richard Black would have a telephone 
conversation with the defendant (Tr. 25 lines 9-20); 
would have sent the letter (Ex. 6; Tr. 25 lines 20-23} 
which was admittedly received by the defendant (Tr. 9 
lines 24-30; Tr. 10 line 1), and the payments admittedly 
received by the defendant (Tr. 10 line 2-7) within a Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
month after the alleged discussion with Molly Allred 
where she ostensibly told Plaintiff Richard Black that 
she had the stock and he could redeem it from her for 
the unpaid balance. It is inconceivable that if such 
a conversation took place that he would go to the extent 
of the letter sent to the defendant and sending the 
payments to California when they could have been paid in 
adjoining offices in Orem, Utah- Even if this Court 
concludes that the trial court properly ruled that 
plaintiffs were in default, plaintiffs were entitled to 
a notice of rescission and to the return of the considera-
tion unless the default had been such an unreasonable 
length of time as to overcome the necessity of notice. 
The requirement for rescission of return of consideration 
cannot be disregarded but is an essential element of the 
rescission. 
CONCLUSION 
In this case, the ruling by the trial court 
deprived the plaintiffs of their rights under the former 
law and under the present Uniform Commercial Code; 
prevented plaintiffs from having the restoration of the 
former status on rescission of the contract of sale or of 
a damage award for the sale without compliance with said 
requirements. Under the agreement between plaintiffs and 
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defendant, there are no specific provisions as to right 
of resale of the stock; as to forfeiture, damages, transfer 
of title and delivery of possession of the stock. The 
result would be unconscionable to deprive the plaintiffs/appel-
lants all right in the stock or, in the alternative, to 
the return of consideration. The trial court erred in 
ruling that the sale of the stock had been terminated 
without compliance with either the former law on sale 
after default or sale as provided under the Commercial 
Code. The judgment should be reversed with instructions 
to enter an award for damages for resale of plaintiffs' 
stock without complying with the statute in force. 
Respectfully submitted this 28th day of May, 
1976. 
•7&./(XJ 1^6 
M. Dayle J e f ^ s S // 
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